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ABSTRACT 
Privacy laws are an important facet of our society. But they can also serve as formidable barriers to 
medical research. The same laws that prevent casual disclosure of medical data have also made it 
difficult for researchers to access the information they need to conduct research into the causes of 
disease. 
But it is possible to overcome some of these legal barriers through technology. The US law known 
as HIPAA, for example, allows medical records to be released to researchers without patient 
consent if the records are provably anonymized prior to their disclosure. 
It is not enough for records to be seemingly anonymous. For example, one researcher estimates that 
87.1 % of the US population can be uniquely identified by the combination of their zip, gender, and 
date of birth - fields that most people would consider anonymous. 
One promising technique for provably anonymizing records is called k-anonymity. It modifies each 
record so that it matches k other individuals in a population - where k is an arbitrary parameter. 
This is achieved by, for example, changing specific information such as a date of birth, to a less 
specific counterpart such as a year of birth. Previous studies have shown that achieving k- 
anonymity while minimizing information loss is an NP-hard problem; thus a brute force search is 
out of the question for most real world data sets. 
In this thesis, we present an open source Java toolkit that seeks to anonymize data while minimizing 
information loss. It uses an optimization fiamework and methods typically used to attack NP-hard 
problems including greedy search and clustering strategies. 
To test the toolkit a number of previously unpublished algorithms and information loss metrics have 
been implemented. These algorithms and measures are then empirically evaluated using a data set 
consisting of 1000 real patient medical records taken from a local hospital. 
The theoretical contributions of this work include: 
(1) A new threat model for privacy - that allows an adversary's capabilities to be modeled using a 
formalism called a virtual attack database. 
(2) Rationally defensible information loss measures - we show that previously published 
information loss measures are difficult to defend because they fall prey to what is known as the 
"weighted indexing problem." To remedy this problem we propose a number of information-loss 
measures that are in principle more attractive than previously published measures. 
(3) Shown that suppression and generalization - two concepts that were previously thought to be 
distinct - are in fact the same thing; insofar as each generalization can be represented by a 
suppression and vice versa. 
(4) We show that Domain Generalization Hierarchies can be harvested to assist the construction of 
a Bayesian network to measure information loss. 
(5) A database can be thought of as a sub-sample of a population. We outline a technique that 
allows one to predict k-anonymity in a population. This allows us, under some conditions, to release 
records that match fewer than k individuals in a database while still achieving k-anonymity against 
an adversary according to some probability and confidence interval. 
While we have chosen to focus our thesis on the anonymization of medical records, our 
methodologies, toolkit and command line tools are equally applicable to any tabular data such as the 
data one finds in relational databases - the most common type of database today. 
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Foreword 
Who would have thought that a Computer Science thesis could be inspired by a 
lecture on public policy? That lecture was given by Frank Field, I11 in a class called 
"Introduction to Technology & Policy." During that lecture he assigned us the task of 
devising a system for allocating kidneys to patients. That is, he handed us a stack of 
simulated medical records and asked us to write a memo outlining a system that would 
determine who should get the kidney first. 
Knowing 111  well that the class was largely composed of engineers, Frank knew 
we would instinctively appeal to quantitative measures of need. Students in the class 
created mathematical expressions that would take into account a person's age, the time they 
had been on a waiting list, and so forth, to determine who was in line to get the kidney first. 
One team stood in front of the class talking about how their system was "highly 
objective" on the basis that anyone could enter the same numbers into their equation and 
get the same ranking. 
Frank correctly pointed out that behind all these so-called "objective" systems" lay 
the highly subjective weights that we had assigned to different criteria such as a subject's 
age. More generally, he said there is no objective way of summing heterogeneous 
quantities or criteria into a single score. In fact, he showed us examples where the ranking 
completely reversed itself - depending on which of several plausible methods were used 
for turning the criteria into scores. He therefore admonished us to stop using words like 
"objective" to describe our rankings and to instead admit what was taking place was a 
political process. 
I carried this lesson with me while doing research for Staal Vinterbo at Harvard 
Medical School. Staal had recently devised an elegant formal framework for anonymizing 
information, His framework sought to anonymize information while maximize the value of 
the information for machine learning and statistical purposes. 
Staal commissioned me and Robert Fischer to write a toolkit that implemented his 
ideas. And it is in the course of writing this toolkit that I developed the experiments laid out 
in this dissertation. I continued working on the problem in the following year when I joined 
Peter Szolovits' Clinical Decision Making Group at the MIT Computer Science and 
Artificial Intelligence lab. It was Peter's former student, Latanya Sweeney, whose seminal 
thesis had created the entire field of what we now know as Computational Disclosure 
Control. 
While implementing the toolkit I discovered that a scoring system Staal had 
published was based on weights - making it subject to the same weighted indexing 
problems pointed out earlier in that Public Policy lecture by Frank Field. I later examined 
other measures in the literature including Latanya Sweeney's PREC metric and found it too 
was a weighted index because it could be interpreted as giving a weight of 1.0 to every 
column. It in effect assigns an equal score (or weight) to knowing if someone had HIV for 
example, or knowing if they were male of female. 
These observations inspired a search for a more rationally defensible basis for 
valuing information loss in the anonymization process. The result may be described as a 
theory and toolkit described in this thesis. 
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Motivation 
Privacy laws are an important facet of our society. But the same laws that prevent 
the casual disclosure of medical records have also made it increasingly difficult for 
researchers to obtain the information that they need to conduct research into the causes of 
disease. In this thesis, we present a theory and method for anonymizing information with a 
focus on the medical domain. 
While we have chosen to focus our thesis on the anonymization of medical records 
the same techniques could potentially be used in any sector that seeks to anonymize tabular 
data (the type of data one finds in relational databases - the most common type of database 
today). 
The Proliferation of Anonymization Systems in the Medicine 
Data privacy systems are quickly becoming an integral part of a broad range of 
medical systems. This is true for a number of reasons. 
First, the disclosure of health information is strictly regulated in many jurisdictions 
and institutions are often legally required to apply privacy-enhancing transformations to 
health data prior to their disclosure to researchers. In the United States, for example, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requires data to undergo 
either one of two privacy-enhancing processes prior to its disclosure. 
In the first process, which may be termed de-identijkation, certain pre-specified 
fields such as name, address and social security number are removed. Although this process 
is sufficient to satisfy legal standards (United States Office of Health And Human Services 
2003), the output of this process may still contain information that can be used to uniquely 
identify a member of the population. For instance, in one study, Sweeney estimated that 
87.1% of the US population can be uniquely identified by the combination of their 5-digit 
zip code, gender, and date of birth (Sweeney 2002) because such records can be linked to 
publicly available databases such as voter lists, and driving records. To prove her point, 
Sweeney re-identified a series of supposedly anonymous medical records including one 
belonging to William Weld - the governor of Massachusetts at the time - using a voter list 
she purchased from the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts for a mere $20 (Sweeney 2002). 
The ease with which she obtained the public records she needed to re-identify his 
record bears eloquent testimony of the inadequacy of de-identification techniques for 
preserving privacy. This motivates our discussion of the second privacy-preserving process 
acceptable under the HIPAA: anonymization. 
An anonymization process renders a record "not individually identifiable" i.e. the 
record's information cannot be used by an adversary "alone or in combination" with other 
"reasonably available information" to uniquely identify an individual (United States Ofice 
of Health And Human Services 2003). This thesis is focused on this second process: 
anonymization. - 
Unlike the first process, which could output data matching a single person in a 
relevant population, an anonymization process outputs records that match at least k 
individuals in a database of N records, where 1 5 k 5 N. Because k is an arbitrary 
parameter, it can be increased or decreased according to the sensitivity of the information 
and the needs of the application. For example, for an online advertising firm a low value of 
k may suffice, whereas in the healthcare domain, a higher value may be required. 
The second reason for the proliferation of anonymization systems is that institutions 
are often hesitant, if not unwilling, to disclose private health information to third parties 
owing to legal liability and the possibility of negative publicity. Although, institutions will 
typically require third parties to sign confidentiality agreements, such assurances cannot 
defend against hacker attacks (Chin 2001), accidental disclosure (Walls 2000), or theft 
(Hines 2006) from insiders or outsiders. And because breaches in confidentiality can 
impede the original data provider's ability to collect the data in the first place (John Hagel 
and Singer 1999; Mandl, Szolovits et al. 2001), while also exposing the original data 
provider to legal liability (Hodge, Gostin et al. 1999), institutions have strong incentives to 
mitigate such risks by anonymizing data prior to its disclosure. 
Another motivation for pursuing anonyrnization systems is the long term vision of 
providing medical researchers, public health officials and policy makers with unfettered 
access to medical information without violating patient privacy (Gostin 1997). In many 
jurisdictions including the United States, researchers must justify their use of data to a 
review board prior to getting access to medical data - in what amounts to a slow and 
cumbersome process. 
Research in automated record anonymization could speed the pace of medical 
research. For example, every hospital could have a record server that could offer 
anonymized records to researchers on-demand thus eliminating the scarcity of medical 
data. 
Moreover, such anonymization systems could allow researchers to more freely 
engage in speculative and exploratory studies. Whereas current practice requires 
researchers to justify every information disclosure to a review board - a process that 
encourages researchers to limit requests to only their most promising studies, review boards 
may feel more comfortable releasing data for more speculative and exploratory studies with 
the advent of anonymization systems. In short, anonymization algorithms may provide the 
key to unlocking stores of medical information. 
Statement of Claims 
In this dissertation I have introduced a number of new idea and technologies; in 
particular, I have: 
1. Presented a new threat model for privacy and a concept called a "Virtual Attack 
Database" which can be used to formally model certain privacy threats. 
2. Outlined a toolkit that can anonymize data and can measure the performance of 
various approaches to anonymizing data 
3. Introduced new anonymization algorithms and new measures of anonyrnization 
performance (to guide such algorithms) that are in principle more attractive than 
previously published measures. 
4. Empirically measured the performance of various anonymization measures and 
algorithms on 1000 real hospital patient records. 
5. Proposed a Bayesian network that can estimate (with a high degree of confidence), 
the k-anonymity of a record in a larger population. This enables researchers to 
safely release records that match less than k records in a database while still 
assuring k-anonymity in a larger population. In sum, this procedure allows 
researchers to preserve more data. 
6. Shown that generalization and suppression; which heretofore, have been thought to 
be distinct concepts are in fact the same thing insofar as every generalization can be 
represented as a suppression and vice versa. This was made possible by introducing 
a concept called an "augmented table" which includes all the fields implied by an 
original table. 
Organization of this dissertation 
First, we will introduce a threat model for privacy. Once the threat model has been 
defined, we examine various methods of defending against these threats, including the 
technique of k-anonymity. Next, we examine how these methods fare under different 
scenarios, leading to a formal definition of the problem we wish to solve. We then 
introduce the Vinterbo framework for privacy, which attempts to anonymize rows in a table 
while maximizing the information value of each row according to some measure function 
for a desired level of k-anonymity. We then examine several measure functions present in 
the literature and discover that current measure functions are difficult to defend rationally, 
leading us to propose several new measure functions. Next we introduce several new 
algorithms for achieving k-anonymity. Our discussion then moves to a toolkit created by 
the author and Robert Fischer that implements our algorithms and measure functions. The 
performance of various algorithms and measures is then empirically evaluated according to 
a number of measures (both new and old) over both real and synthetic patient data We then 
enter a discussion of how some of our initial assumptions can be relaxed to preserve more 
data. 
A threat model for privacy 
We now define a threat model for privacy which we will refer to later in this paper. 
Before defining the problem formally, we will begin with a less formal definition. We 
begin by defining privacy risk. 
The "privacy risk" of a piece of data (or datum) could be described as its "risk of 
re-identification." It represents the risk of identifying an individual from a piece of 
information given all other information available to an adversary (United States Office of 
Health And Human Services 2003). 
For the purposes of developing a threat model we distinguish between electronic 
privacy and non-electronic privacy. To explain the difference, we concoct an example. 
Suppose you knew I liked to wear tall green hats (a rate trait). You could use this 
information to identify me in a public square. But unless this information (alone or in 
combination with other information available to my adversary) can be linked to some 
identifier in an electronic database, you cannot use this information to identify me using 
techniques such as "record linkage" (Felligi and Sunter 1969). This leads to a problem 
definition. 
Suppose there exists a hypothetical database consisting of the amalgamation of all 
possible databases available to an adversary. Suppose this database also includes all fields 
that could be inferred by our adversary. We refer to this database as the virtual attack 
database. This virtual attack database is virtual in the sense that it may not actually be 
assembled but it could be constructed, if one or more databases were linked together using 
the fmily of record linkage techniques first described by Felligi and Sunter (Felligi and 
Sunter 1969). 
This leads us to the notion of privacy risk, which could also be referred to as the 
risk of re-identification. If a field's value does not exist in an adversary's virtual attack 
database, then consequently there can be no electronic privacy risk associated with that 
data item for that given adversary. It is still possible, however, that another adversary will 
have a virtual attack database that could be linked to my field. But if no database fields in 
any virtual attack database could be linked to or inferred from my penchant for wearing tall 
green hats, then this knowledge about me does not cany any electronic privacy risk 
whatsoever. 
Nonetheless, the knowledge that a person likes to wear tall green hats in a certain 
city still poses a risk insofar as such information could potentially be used to identify that 
person in a public square. We term this risk, a general privacy risk - as it requires no 
database to exist (or potentially exist) for a risk to be present. Put another way, the General 
Privacy of a datum encompasses both its electronic and nonelectronic privacy risk. 
In this thesis, we are solely focusing on reducing electronic privacy risk. For many 
applications, a consideration of general privacy reduces to an exercise in minimizing the 
electronic privacy risk. In other applications - particularly where an adversary can use a 
piece of information without the need to correlate it with data in a database - a general 
privacy risk exists in absence of an electronic privacy risk. 
Having defmed the problem informally, we now define the problem of electronic 
privacy risk formally. Let U represent the universal set from which individuals in a 
database are drawn. This universe will vary according to the application. For instance, if 
the database belongs to a small local clinic, the universe might consist of only the 
individuals living in the surrounding geographic areas served by the clinic, whereas if the 
database belongs to a mid-sized hospital, the universe may include individuals in a larger 
geographic area. 
Let SSU represent the subset of individuals from the universe with records in a 
database, D. And let f(s) return a vector representing the fields in the database for record s. 
For simplicity, we overload notation to writef; to represent the vector representing the ith 
individual in S where 1 s IS1 (assuming S has at least one record). 
Today, one can readily buy a number of public records such as voter lists, birth 
records, driving records, and credit reports. Therefore, let us suppose an adversary has 
access to a "virtual attack database" containing records associated with a set of individuals 
R EU. Let g(r) represent a function that returns a vector whose elements represent the 
fields for the individual r=R in the attack database. For simplicity we write gi to represent 
the record corresponding to the ith individual in R. Also let us suppose that the fields 
returned by g() include a social security number or any other group of one or more fields 
that in combination could uniquely identify a member of the population. Such collections 
of identifying fields we will hereafter term quasi-identifies (Dalenius 1986) because such 
fields can be used in combination to uniquely identify an individual. In order for a group 
of fields to qualify as a quasi-identifier, the collection of fields must exist in a database that 
either exists or could be potentially be constructed by an adversary. Otherwise the 
adversary will have no way of using these fields to uncover the respondent's identity. 
If there are some overlapping fields in f(s) and g(r), then the adversary can attempt 
to use record linkage techniques (Felligi and Sunter 1969) to link the records corresponding 
to people in S to the individuals in R. We wish to find a privacy enhancing data 
transformation Ai() for each record i=S such that each transformed record will match at 
least k individuals in U. We, however, cannot be sure what data the adversary has; i.e. the 
fbnction g() is unknown and thus also unknown are the quasi-identifiers used by the 
adversary. What we can be sure of, however, is that if there are at least k elements in S for 
whom information in f(s) matches A($) then there are at least k individuals in U that match 
that same criteria. Consequently, if we only release information matching k individuals in 
S, the adversary can narrow down the search to at most k individuals in R. In general, if a 
given record matches k records in R, we say that the record has "k-anonymity" - a phrase 
first coined by Sweeney (Sweeney 2003). A record's k-anonymity can generally be 
increased by increasing the granularity of fields within the record. This parameter k, may be 
thought of as a quantifiable measure of privacy. The higher the number, k, the greater 
anonymity of the records output of the anonymization process. 
Methods of Anonymizing fields 
In order to motivate the row anonymization algorithms in our toolkit we will go 
over some methods of anonymizing individual fields: 
Method 1: Ranging 
Ranging achieves k-anonymity by subsuming two ranges into a new range. For 
example, the two age ranges [10,25] and [8,20] could be ranged into [8,25]. 
Method 2: Binning 
Binning refers to the process of assigning various inputs into bins according to 
some criteria. A simple example of this is the discretization of ages such as 10 and 15 into 
pre-specified mutually exclusive age ranges such as [lo, 121 and [ 13,151. 
Method 3: Generalization 
Generalization refers to the replacement of one data value, with a "more general, 
less specific value, that is faithful to the original" (Sweeney 2003). For example a city can 
be generalized to a less specific locale such as a county or a state; while a date of birth 
could be generalized to a year of birth or interval such as [25,30] representing an age range. 
The generalizations that are possible for each attribute in a database S can be represented 
through a partially ordered set known as a Domain Generalization Hierarchy (DGH) 
(Sweeney 2003). Given an attribute A of a private table PT, Sweeney defines a domain 
generalization hierarchy (DGH) for an attribute A as a set of functionsfh : h=O, ..., N-1: 
such that A=Ao and lANl = l .  The latter requirement ensures that the final transformation 
generalizes to a single value - a useful trait to model deletion of the data, which in the 
statistical literature is referred to as "cell suppression." 
The DGH formalism models some hierarchies well but it fails to model others. 
Consider for example the hierarchy for zip code illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure I :  An example of a domain generalization 
hierarchy, representing the possible generalizations 
of some US zip codes. 
This generalization hierarchy is perfectly captured by a DGH. On the other hand, 
there are some generalizations that a DGH cannot handle - particularly when a single 
value can generalize to more than one value. These situations are not merely theoretical 
curiosities; rather they do occur in real practice. 
Consider for example, the generalization hierarchy corresponding to data 
distributed by the US Census Bureau (shown in Figure 2). In this example we see that a 
census block can have multiple possible generalizations. In fact, Figure 2 illustrates that a 
census block can be generalized to no less than 13 different designations including a Zip 
Code or a Place (which encapsulates cities, boroughs and other geographic designations). 
Another example demonstrating the need for multiple generalizations occurs 
when one wishes to discretize continuous values into a data structure called a lattice. The 
need for such a data structure arises, for example, when one wishes to bin ages into an 
age range - while still allowing those age ranges to be further generalizable to still wider 
age ranges. While one could impose a hierarchy where every single age range had only a 
single parent, the additional flexibility afforded by the lattice may capture more 
information. 




0-60 1 1-80 
I \ I \ 
0-40 1 1-60 20-80 
I \ I \ I \ 
0-20 1 1-40 2 1 -60 41-80 
I \ I \ I \ I \ 
0-10 1 1-20 2 1 -40 4 1 -60 60-80 
Figure 3: An Age Lattice demonstrating that the ability for 
each node to have more than one parent is highly useful. 
Figure 3 illustrates how such a lattice could be constructed to handle a continuous 
variable such as age. It can be seen upon inspection that such a lattice can be constructed 
for any arbitrary dicretization quanta. 
The need for a lattice also becomes apparent when one wishes to use information 
theoretic measures such as mutual information as measures of information loss. Because 
such measures are not defined for continuous values, it becomes necessary to discretize 
the data. A lattice provides an elegant generalization hierarchy for discretizing such 
continuous values. 
The latter three examples (age discretization, census generalization, and mutual 
information calculation) highlight the inadequacy of the DGH formalism to model 
multiple generalizations. To this end, we define a formalism called a Value 
Generalization Partially Ordered Set or VG-POSET. For simplicity we refer to this data 
structure as a Poset hereafter. A Poset is similar to a DGH, but it allows a single attribute 
to be generalized onto multiple possible attributes. 
Definition 1: Value Generalization Partially Ordered Set 
Formally, a Partially Ordered Value Generalization Hierarchy (VG-Poset) for an 
attribute A is defined as a set of functions J;,: 1;J: Ai ---+ Aj such that mi>j and for 
every i there exists at least oneJj, and IANI =l. Again we use the latter requirement on AN 
to force a single ultimate generalization representing the deletion of the cell. 
Definition 2: Measure function k c )  
A measure function r(r) for a record r returns a real number representing the utility 
(or value) of the record r to the user, where 0 < I.(.) < m, with 0 representing the best 
possible score, and larger scores representing increasingly lower information value. 
Properties of a Measure Function 
We assume that one or many measure functions could be used. However, we wish 
to specify two minimum properties that a measure function should satisfy. 
First, we require monotonicity; that is, if there exists a function& in the domain 
generalization hierarchy (meaning that A, is a more general form than Ai and that 
consequently A, has less information content) and rl €Ai and r2 €A, then i(rS < z(r2). 
Second, we require transitivity. Let X= (rl, r2,. . , rl) represent a vector of arbitrary 
length I.  If each of the ri represents an element in the {A$ such that for every pair (ri,ri+$ 
there exists a f u n ~ t i ~ n f ; ~ + ~ . ,  then the measure function must provide that for all u>v, z(rJ > 
z(rJ. Put another way, if the vector X represents a path through the PODGH, then every 
generalization is required to have a "worse" score than its more specific predecessor; i.e. 
we are requiring strict monotonicity among these scores. 
Definition 3: Least Upper Bound (LUB) 
We define the Least Upper Bound of two values vl, and v2, i.e. L UB(vl, v2) for a 
Poset, D as follows. Let A={al,a2,a3, ... , aA$  be the set of values in D that are the ancestors 
of both vl and v2. For every element in A, let us take the measure of that value. Let M be 
the minimum measure value among these measures. Then the LUB of vl and v2 is the 
subset of A whose measure values are equivalent to the lowest measure value; i.e.: 
LUB(v1,v2) ={ ai I z(aJ < z(aJ for all j E{1,2, ... lAI) ) 
Similarly we define the LUB of two records X and Y as the painvise LUB between the 
elements of X and Y; i.e. : 
Notice however that the LUB of two records is a set whose elements are also sets. This 
resultant, we term a "LUB set." 
Definition 4: Least Upper Bound of a LUB Set and a Record R 
Let LS ={{XI1,Xl2, ... X/,' {X21,X22, ..., XZk), ... {xNhXN2, ..., XNL}) be a LUBSet and 
let r = <Xl,X2, .. .,XN> be a record. For simplicity of notation we re-define the LUBSet as 
{Z1,Z2. ... ZN} where the Zi are sets of rows, and let F = {Zl x{Xl), ZzX{X2}. ... , ZNX{XN)). 
Again for convenience we re-name the sets F is composed of as F=(FI, F2, .... FN). We 
now define the LUB of the LUBSet LS and a record r as: 
where LUBi(xy) represents the LUB of the ith element of set X with the vector 
representing a record y and i is chosen such that z(LUBi(Fl x F2 x . x FN, R)) is 
minimized. 
We also define the LUB of more than two rows, written rl,r2, .. . , r~ as: 
LUB(rl,rZ,rS ,.., rN) = LUB( ... (LUB(LUB(rl,rz),r3) ... ),rN) 
An optimization problem 
Let T represent a table where the columns represent attributes and the rows 
represent individuals in the population (i.e. patients, customers, et cetera). We wish to 
create a new table T' by replacing each row, r,  in T with the LUB of the original row and 
k-1 other rows, written rl, r2, ... , rk-1 such that the measure, z() for the LUB(r, r r  r2, .. , rk. 
1) is minimized. 
As shown in Vinterbo (Vinterbo 2002), achieving k-anonymity is an NP-hard 
problem. As a result, all practical algorithms must make numerous choices at various points 
in the arnbiguation process. What attributes should be sacrificed (i.e. generalized) and 
which should be kept? Unless the algorithm has some notion of information value, it has no 
basis to guide such decisions. 
Our Extensions to the Vinterbo Framework 
The Vinterbo framework provides an elegant way of modeling the k-anonymity problem. 
But a researcher using the Vinterbo framework is faced with the problem of defining zt), the 
measure function. In this dissertation we explore different measure functions, in search of ones that 
are rationally defensible. 
Related Work 
1. DataFZy (Sweeney) - DataFly was the first published k-ambiguity algorithm. It has 
no notion of information value and is therefore a blind algorithm. 
2. K-Similar (Sweeney) - K-similar also achieves k-anonymity. K-similar, unlike 
DataFly, does utilize a notion of information value; however, we show that the 
information measure used by the K-similar algorithm falls into a category known as 
a "weighted index" that is difficult to justify rationally; we later present measure 
functions which have a more sound rational basis. 
3. p-argus and r-argus (Hunderpool, et al.) - Developed at Statistics Netherlands, this 
system was proven by Sweeney to not provide sufficient k-anonymity. 
Our work differs fiom the others through (1) the use of a formal framework; (2) our 
exposition on why the measure hc t ions  of existing algorithms cannot be defended (3) the 
introduction of new ambiguation algorithms and defensible measure functions (4) the use 
of empirical measures of real data and (5) the theoretical contributions listed in our 
statement of claims (see page 13). Further the source code for this project has been released 
as an open source project, whereas the source code for the above projects are not available. 
Attacks on k-anonymity 
Having defined how we intend to achieve k-anonymity, we now define attacks 
against our system. 
Unsorted Matching Attack (Sweeney 2002) 
A table can be k-anonymized in many different ways. Thus it is possible to release 
many different anonymized versions of the same table. If the rows in those anonymized 
tables are listed in the same order; than one can combine the rows from different tables to 
infer more information that was otherwise possible by examining each individual row. To 
thwart this attack one can simply randomize the order in which the rows are released in 
each disclosure. 
Linking Attack 
This Attack (Felligi and Sunter 1969) recognizes that records in different databases 
can be linked together. The attack begins by calibrating a probability model whose 
parameters include the probability of finding similarities and differences between two 
records referring to the same individual. The similarities might include factors such as 
"having the same last name" while the differences might include "having a spelling error 
with a string edit distance of 1." Using this model one can estimate the probability that 
records in two different databases refer to the same individual. An arbitrary probability 
threshold is set above which two records are said to be a match. For example, one might 
declare that "all records with 95% likelihood of being a match will be considered a match." 
Complementary Release Attack 
This attack recognizes that if one discloses an anonymized version of a table then 
that table should be considered to be "joining external information" available to an 
adversary (Sweeney 2002). The implication is that if one releases some portion of a table in 
the present (which we shall call PT) that may limit one's ability to safely release an 
anonymized version of the same table in the future (which we shall call FT). One solution 
to this problem is to based FT on PT; or to consider PT as a part of the quasi-identifier. 
Temporal attack 
Because tables tend to change over time, subsequent releases of a table may allow 
one to draw inferences (Sweeney 2002). The solution is to not anonymize the current table 
but instead base the disclosure on the union of the previously disclosed tables and the new 
rows added to the table. 
Attributes Occurring Less Than k Times Attack 
Attributes occurring less than k times can possibly lead to re-identification 
(Sweeney 2002). Consider, for example, a table corresponding to the inhabitants of a 
village where all people have the race "white" whereas one person has the race "black." In 
a k-anonymized version of the original table, the black person's race will be the only one 
that is suppressed. Thus, we can readily re-identify this record, even if the race attribute is 
suppressed and regardless of how high a level of k was selected. One can defend from this 
attack by deleting all rows containing values occurring less than k times. 
Measure Functions 
There are a number of possible measure functions of information value. In the 






is a released row 
is the number of rows in the original table, 
is the number of columns in the original table, 
is the height in the domain generalization hierarchy for attribute i 
where the leaves are considered height 0. 
is the height of the node in the Domain Generalization Hierarchy 
corresponding to the value of the cell (ij) in the generalized table. 
To gain insight into the workings of the PREC measure, we introduce equation 2. 
Whereas equation 1 is a measure that applies to an entire table, the measure listed in 
equation 2 can be interpreted as the PREC measure for an individual row. Put another way, 
when averaged over all rows, Equation 2 reduces to the PREC measure listed in Equation 
(1)- 
Although the PREC measure would seem to be a reasonable measure of 
information value it falls into a category of measures called "weighted indexes" which are 
known to be rationally indefensible. We illustrate this by example. Suppose we have a 
database with three attributes; namely has-renalfailure, has-hiv (a binary field indicating 
the presence of the HIV virus) and gender. Assume all three fields are associated with a 2 
level domain value hierarchy shown in Figure 4. 
* * * 
I \ I \ I \ 
male female yes no true false 
Figure 4: Domain Generalization Hierarchies for gender, 
has-renal-failure and has-hiv 
Now consider the rows of Figure 5. The first row of the table represents the 
original row, while the second, third and fourth rows respectively represent the original row 
where the fields of gender, HIV or renal failure have been generalized. The PREC measure 
does not distinguish between these three generalizations insofar as it assigns the same 
PREC score to each of these three rows. More pointedly, to the PREC measure the fields 
gender, HIV and renal failure are equally valuable. 
But upon what basis does this algorithm assign the same value to preservation of 
the gender field as it assigns to the preservation of HIV? And if HIV shouldn't be equally 
valuable as gender, how many times more valuable should HIV be than gender? Whatever 
answers are given to these rhetorical questions are likely to lack a rational basis. 
Figure 5: The frailty of weighted indexing. The first row 
represents the original row, whereas each subsequent row is 
a mirror of the original but with a different attribute 
suppressed. Although rows two through four suppress 
different attributes of the original row, their PREC measure 
is the same. This indicates that the PREC measure 
implicitly considers the columns Gender, HIV and Renal 
Failure to be of equal value. 
The problem just outlined is sometimes referred to as the "weighted indexing 
problem" and it arises whenever quantities of non-convertible heterogeneous units are 
summed into a single unit. It fails to be resolved if heterogeneous units are multiplied by a 
weight before the summation takes place. A treatment of this problem is found in Field's 
PhD thesis (Frank Remson Field 1985). Field shows that weighted indexing cannot be 
rationally defended as a measure of utility, and that neither normalization nor the 
conversion to ranks can solve the fundamental problem. 
Another possible weighting method is presented as an example by Vinterbo 
(Vinterbo 2002). In this system the leaves of the Poset (or Domain Generalization 
Hierarchy) are assigned a value of 0 (which is considered a perfect score) while subsequent 
levels are assigned progressively higher values such that the monotonicity property of the 
measure function is satisfied. To compute the value of a row one sums the values of nodes 
corresponding to values in each column. This again constitutes a weighted index (with a 
weight of 1 .O) for each column. 
Description 
Original Row 
Gender Cell Generalized 
Gender Cell Generalized 





















In many respects, this metric mirrors Sweeney's PREC metric insofar as the value 
of a data item is totally dependent on its level in the hierarchy. In fact, if one sets the 
measure of each node in the hierarchy to its height in the hierarchy, one obtains the same 
result as that illustrated in Figure 3 - where the fields HIV, gender, and renal failure are 
implicitly considered by the measure function to be equally valuable. 
If weighted indexes cannot be rationally defended are there any information 
measures that can be defended? We propose a number of measures in order of increasing 
defensibility. 
Proposed Measure 1: Mutual Information Of A Column With Respect To A Target Variable 
Since the purpose for disclosing the data in the first place is to build predictive 
models, we propose using the Mutual Information with respect to the predicted variable as 
a column weight. Of course, this assumes we know in advance what variable we wish to 
predict. In such a situation this would seem to be a more rational approach than simply 
using a weight of 1.0 for all columns, as was done in earlier examples. The mutual 
information between a variable X and a predicted class variable C is defined as: 
where X is a random vector representing the rows in the database, and C is a class variable 
we wish to predict. The above equation however is a metric for an entire column; whereas 
we need a measure for a specific row. We propose that the mutual information scores for 
each column be summed, in order to calculate this metric for a row. 
For example, suppose we have a table where each row represents a patient and 
where the columns represent attributes of a patient. If one of the columns is a binary 
variable representing the diagnosis of cancer, then we can use the mutual information of all 
variables with respect to the binary variable cancer as our information measure. 
The use of mutual information as an information value measure is not a panacea. It 
requires us to declare in advance one or more variables that will be predicted by the 
predictive models that the data will be used to build. But in many applications, we simple 
may not know how the data will be used and so will be unable to determine what variable 
should be optimizd. 
Moreover, the use of the mutual information metric may have unexpected effects 
on l tu re  disclosures owing to the consequences of the Complementary Release Attack 
(Sweeney 2002) discussed on page 25. In the context of using mutual information, the 
implication of this attack takes on additional connotations: by releasing a table optimized 
for predictive modeling of one variable, we may also limit our ability to release information 
optimized for other variables 
The mutual information metric also suffers from another serious problem. If the 
table we are trying to anonymized has more than one column (other than the column we are 
trying to predict) we are again faced with the weighted indexing problem when summing 
the measures from the individual columns into a measure for the entire row. It is perfectly 
defensible to sum the mutual information scores of the columns into a single score if the 
columns contain no redundant information (or put another way, if the columns were 
generated wholly independent of each other). But this assumption is almost certainly 
violated in practice. Nonetheless, the fact that there are situations where the columns can be 
defensibly summed, and the fact that the weights are generated from the data itself, makes 
this measure more defensible than totally arbitrary weight of 1.0. 
Proposed Measure 2: The Degradation in Performance of a Predictive Model 
Suppose we know in advance the variable that the data will be used to predict. 
Suppose we also have a predictive model that can handle missing values (although this 
assumption will be later relaxed). If the output of the model for each row on the l l l y  
identifiable data is taken as a "gold standard" - then deviations from this output can be seen 
as error introduced by the anonymization process. This measure can be calculated at the 
individual row level (as the deviation from the gold standard) or at a table level (using 
measures such as the mean, average, total error and standard deviation). Predictive models 
particularly suited to this purpose include Bayesian networks and Decision trees since they 
can both handle missing information. 
It is also possible to use predictive models that cannot normally handle missing 
input values if the missing data consist of categorical values (as opposed to continuous 
ones). Techniques for handling missing information include the Expectation Maximization 
(Dempster, Laird et al. 1977), Gibbs Sampling (Geman and Geman 1984), Multiple 
Imputation (J.L Schafer 1999) and Robust Bayes Estimation (Ramoni and Sebastiani 
2001). 
A method for utilizing a Bayesian model as a measure function 
Here we propose a method for a constructing a Bayesian model that could serve as 
the predictive model for measure 2. It will also be shown that this model can also be used 
to predict missing values. The basic idea is to harvest the structural information inherent in 
a DGH or Poset to aid the discovery of the structure of our model. 
Before getting into the details we first introduce the idea of impliedfields in a table. 
The concept of implied fields is useful when modeling generalization using a Poset or 
DGH. Consider for example a simple table such as that found in Figure 6, and suppose that 
Race and HIV cannot be generalized (except by suppression) but that the field Zip can be 
generalized according to the DGH set out in Figure 1. Suppose however, that we augment 
this table with the "implied fields" zip4, and zip3 representing the 4-digit and 3-digit 
generalizations of the 5-digit zip codes in column zip5. We call this table, an augmented 
table because the original table has been augmented to include all implied fields. 














Figure 7: An Augmented Table for a simple table 
containing a Zip code where the first row has been 
generalized to a 4 digit zip. 
Herein lies the elegance of this model. In this augmented table, every generalization 
is represented by exactly one cell suppression. In Figure 7 for example, a row had the value 
"02139" in the zip5 field. To generalize this field into its four-digit counterpart (i.e. 
"0213") we simply suppress the zip5 field while leaving the values in the zip4 and zip3 
intact. It can also be seen upon inspection that every suppression can be represented as a 
generalization in an augmented table. 
Earlier, we mentioned that the information loss of an anonymization algorithm on a 
data set can be measured using a predictive model; however, we have not show how to 
build such a model. As will be shown, one can harvest the structure of a DGH (using an 
Augmented Table) to build a Bayesian Network which can serve as the predictive model. 
Race 
M i t e  
Black 
Asian 








1. Construct a model using the fully identifiable information. 
This model is constructed using techniques commonly used by Bayesian 
practitioners. One common practice is to split a data set into two parts (Mitchell 
1997). The first (the "training set") is used to discover the structure of the Bayesian 
network and to train the model. The second, (the "test set") is used to test the 









adding fields (one at a time) ordered by their mutual information scores with 
respect to the variable being predicted1. As each field is added to the Bayesian 
Network, the Bayesian network is retrained using the training set. When the 
performance of the model on the training set begins to decrease, no M e r  fields 
are added and the performance of the network is then tested on the test set. If the 
model performs well on the test set, the model is said to be "generalizable" insofar 
as it performed well on a data set on which it was neither constructed nor trained. 
2. Enhance the Bayesian Model using Implied Fields and Information from the 
Poset 
Suppose in the last step a simple model was constructed with a node configuration 
as follows: 
Zip5 - HIV 
A / Race 
For every field in the model constructed at step 1, we add nodes in the Bayesian 
network corresponding to its parents in the DGH or Poset. For instance, in the latter 
example we would have: 
Zip3 + Zip4 9 Zip5 9 HIV 
/ 
Race 
That is, 3-digit zip code would try to predict the 4-digit zip code (when the 4-digit 
zip code was missing), and the 4-digit zip code would try to predict the 5-digit zip 
code (when the 5-digit zip code was missing). 
' A procedure mentioned by Marco Ramoni, a Bayesian specialist and Professor of Pediatrics and Medicine at Harvard 
Medical School. 
3. Add Further fields to the model as appropriate 
One may discover, for example, that the field "race" may help predict one or more 
of zip3, zip4 or zip5 Thus, it is appropriate to have a third step where one adds 
nodes to the Bayes network, using the Mutual Information procedure outlined in 
step 1. The final outcome of this process may look like something like this: 
Zip3 + Zi 4 9 Zip5 + HIV 
f0GG 
Race 
The link from race to Zip5 and Zip4 would seem to indicate that race can 
predict one's zip codes with a certain specificity - an unsurprising conclusion when 
one considers that many neighborhoods contain a preponderance of people from a 
given race. 
The above procedure is but one way of discovering the structure of a Bayesian network; 
however, we believe this procedure is advantageous insofar as it harvests the structure of 
the DGH to aid the discovery process. Given that there is, at present, no generally accepted 
method for discovering the structure of a Bayesian network, it would seem that this 
procedure offers a good start. 
It would also seem that such a network could also be used to attack k-anonymity, 
however, such application is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
The DSG Privacy Toolkit 
The DSG Privacy Toolkit is a Java API and a collection of command line tools 
written by the author and Robert Fischer that anonymizes information using an extended 
version of the Vinterbo framework. We now outline the toolkit and some of the design 
choices made. 
As noted earlier, the DSG Privacy Toolkit achieves k-ambiguity via generalization. 
In order to ambiguate data using the toolkit 3 things need to be specified: (1) the data to be 
anonymized (2) partially-ordered generalization hierarchies for each attribute, and (3) an 
ambiguation algorithm. We now outline each of these thee aspects in greater detail. 
Value Generalization Partially Ordered Set (VG-Posets or Posets for short) 
Generalization is implemented via the Least Upper Bound (LUB) operator (as 
earlier defined). In order to specify the Least Upper Bound operator for an attribute a 
partially ordered set (Poset) is necessary. Our toolkit has several built-in Posets, all of 
which implement the Poset interface. 
Different fields can be better represented by different kinds of Partially Ordered 
Sets. In the DSG toolkit, these Posets are represented by classes implementing the Poset 
interface. Moreover, each type of Poset has associated with it a particular type of node that 
is used to represent values in the hierarchy. These nodes inherit from the PosetNode class. 
Configuration Files 
The DSG toolkit's command line interface uses two configuration files - 
Column.xm1 and Hierarchy.xm1. Both are required to load data from a Comma Separated 
Values (CSV) file. The Hierarchy.xm1 file specifies VG-Posets and Domain Generalization 
Hierarchies; whereas the Colurnns.xm1 file binds these aforementioned Posets to specific 
columns in a CSV file. In the examples that follow we describe all built-in Posets 
supported by the toolkit and how the configuration files can be configured to instantiate 
each possible Poset. 
Posets 
Here we present different classes associated with different types of Posets. For each 
Poset we present an overview of how it works and the situations in which it is usem. The 
toolkit can be used in two different ways: as an API and as a command line tool. As a result 
we provide two ways of instantiating each class (1) via source code (which is useful when 
the toolkit is being used via an API) and (2) via the Hierarchy.xm1 configuration file, when 
the toolkit is being used as a standalone anonymization tool. 
RangePoset and RangeNode 
A RangePoset is useful for describing attributes that represent ranges. In particular 
it implements ranges that satisfy the property that the LUB of [A,B] and [C,D] is 
[min(A,C), max(B,D)] where A,B,C, and D are double precision floating point numbers 
that were encapsulated into a RangeNode class. A RangePoset is particularly suited for 
describing a hierarchy of age ranges because the upper bound of two age ranges such as 
[10,20] and [15,30] satisfies the latter property (i.e. the upper bound would be [10,30]). We 
do not call the latter, however, a least upper bound, because age ranges do not always 
satisfy the above LUB property. Consider, for example, the non-overlapping age ranges 
[lo, 121 and [14,15]; here the LUB is not [ 10,151 since the element 13 is not included in the 
least upper bound Nonetheless [lo, 151 can be considered an upper bound, and so a 
RangePoset can be used in that manner. RangePoset can be constructed as follows: 
RangePoset(doub1e low, double high) where low and high respectively represent the lower and 
upper limits of allowable values. The LUB function of the RangePoset class accepts 
RangeNode objects or a LUBset class. 
// create a new RangePoset that can hold 
// people within the ages of 10 to 90 
RangePoset AgeRangePoset = new RangePo~et(10~90); 
// Create a node representing an 
// age range from 10 to 30 years of age 
RangeNode AgeRangel = new RangeNode(10,30); 
// Create a node representing an 
// age range from 20 to 34 years of age 
RangeNode AgeRange2 = new RangeNode (20,35) ; 
// find the LUB of the two age ranges 
RangeNode result = AgeRangel.lub(AgeRange2); 
Example 1: How a RangePoset and RangeNode are used 
The following is an example of how one might create a RangePoset in the Hierarchy.xm1 file: 
I I 
Example 2: How a RangePoset can be instantiated in the Hierarchy.xm1 file 
In the above example we have created a RangePoset called "Age-rangegoset" 
whose ranges can span from 0 to 120 and where the maximum difference in ages before the 
RangeNode assumes an information value of 0 is 25. 
MatrixPoset and MultiNode 
Partially ordered sets that can take on a finite number of values (such as the one 
shown in Figure 3) can be thought of as a directed graph represented by a collection of 
nodes and directed edges. The nodes represent items in the hierarchy, and the edges 
represent less than or equal to relationships within the hierarchy. The MatrixPoset allows 
one to specify such Posets. It uses the MatrixNode class to specify specific nodes in the 
Poset. To speed computations, the less than or equal to relationship (LEQ) is pre-computed 
for all possible pairs of values in the MatrixLattice. To more rapidly calculate this table, we 
note that the lookup table listing the LEQ relationship is the transitive closure of the 
adjacency matrix between all nodes - a realization that enables us to take advantage of 
relatively efficient algorithms for transitive closure in the literature. While such pre- 
computation increases the initial start-up time for our anonyrnization process, we have 
found that pre-computation resulted in considerable performance improvements - changing 
our run times fiom hours to minutes. 
/ /  create a MatrixPoset to represent a hierarchy 
/ /  of ZIP codes 
/ /  create a new MatrixPoset that can hold 8 nodes 
MatrixPoset MP = new MatrixPoset (8) ; 
// add the nodes 
MP. addNode (\\*" ,4) ; 
MP. addNode (\\021ff, 3) ; 
MP. addNode (w0213N ,2) ; 
MP. addNode ("0214" ,2) ; 
MP. addNode (n02139w, 1) ; 
MP. addNode (\\02138", 1) ; 
MP.addNode ("02140", 1) ; 
MP. addNode (n02141w, 1) ; 
// set the less than or equal to relationships 
MP. setLeq(MP. getNode ( \ \ * I f )  , MP. getNode (\\02lW) ) ;
MP. setLeq (MP. getNode (\\02lW) , MP. getNode (\\0213ff) ) ; 
MP. setLeq (MP. getNode (\\021ff) , MP. getNode (\\0214") ) ; 
MP.~etLeq(MP.getNode(\\0213~~) ,MP.getN0de(\\02138~~)) ; 
MP.~etLeq(MP.getNode(\\0213~~) ,MP.getN0de(~02139~~)) ; 
MP. ~etLeq(MP.getNode(\\0214~~) ,MP.getNode ("02140ff) ) ; 
MP. ~etLeq(MP.getNode(\\0214~~) ,MP.getNode(\\02141ff) ) ;
// pre-calculate LUB values 
MP. setTclosure () ; 
// find the LUB of 0213 and 0214 
Matridode MN1 = new Matridode (MP. getNodet\0213") 
MatrixNode MN2= new MatrixNode (MP. getNode\\0214") 
LUBSet result = MP.getLubset (MNl,MN2); 
/ /  result now holds a LubSet containing the node "021N 
Example 3: How a MatrixPoset is used 
'The following is an example of how one might create a MatrixPoset in the Hierarchy.xm1 file: 
<MatrixPoset Name="ICD9-Codes" RootNoar -"ID9000000"> 
<Node I D="ID9000000 Name=" - Value="l " Parents="ID9000000"/> 
<Node ID="ID9000001" Name="008" Value="l" Parents="ID9000000"/> 
<Node ID="ID9000002" Name="03IM Value="lW Parents="ID9000000"/> 
<Node ID="ID9000003" Name="038" Value="l" Parents="ID9000000"/> 
</MatrixPoset> 
,- 
Example 4: How a MatrixPoset can be Instantiated in the Hierarchy.xm1 file 
In the latter example, we have a MatrixPoset of 3 Diagnostic Related Grouping 
(DRG) codes representing different medical procedures. The root node in the hierarchy 
represents the suppression of the cell. As always, this root node is its own parent and we've 
given it the name "*" (a symbol often used to denote a wildcard) to denote that a deleted 
cell could match any value. The remaining three nodes represent the DRG codes allowable 
in the data set - all of whom list the root node as their parent. 
PowerPoset 
A group of one or more binary fields can be represented by a PowerPoset. The 
PowerPoset assumes that the LUB of two bit-vectors a and b is a A b, where the A operator 
represents a bitwise AND operator. As an example, let us suppose that a and b are both 
two-bit bit vectors, where the first bit represents the presence of "HIV" and the second 
represents the presence of renal failure. The LUB of a and b will be the traits common to 
both vectors a and b. In other words, the LUB of a and b is analogous to a set intersection 
operator. 
/ /  create a new PowerSet that can hold 
// 3 boolean fields 
PowerSet PS = new PowerSet(3); 
/ /  Create 2 power nodes of length 3 
/ /  (initialized to binary '000' ) 
PowerNode PN1 = new PowerNode (3) ; 
PowerNode PN2 = new PowerNode(3) ; 
// set the second and fifth positions of 
// the two Boolean vectors to '1' . 
PNl.set(2,l); / /  turns on the second bit of PN1 
PNl.set(3,l) ; // turns on the third bit of PN1 
PN2.set(3,1) ; // turns on the third bit of PN2 
PowerNode result = PS . lub (PN1, PN2) ; 
// result now holds a PowerNode with binary value 011 
Example 5: How a PowerPoset is used 
The following is an example of how one might create a PowerPoset in the Hierarchy.xrn1 
file: 
- 
<PowerPoset Name="Has-HIV" Bits="l "I> 
Example 6: How a PowerPoset can be instantiated in the Hierarchy.xm1 file 
In the latter example, we initiated a Poset for a single Boolean bit that will store 
whether or not a person has HIV. 
DateOfiirthPoset 
A DateOfBirthPoset is useful in situations where one wants to preserve as much 
information about a date of birth as possible. Its LUB operator preserves as much 
information as is common to its two inputs. If the two dates of birth do not occur in the 
same year, it converts both inputs into age ranges to see if they fall into the same range, 
in which case it returns the date of birth of a person who was born at the midpoint of that 
age range. Finally, if no commonality can be found at the age range level, it suppresses 
the cell. The DateOJBirthNode keeps track of the granularity of the node (i.e. day of 
birth, month of birth, year of birth, age range, or suppression). The purpose of this to 
facilitate calculating LUBSets. A LUBSet of several different dates of birth falling into 
the same age range will not change if an additional DateOfBirthNode falling within the 
same age range is added. 
Here we give a formal definition for the LUB operator. Let a date be composed of the 
triplet (d,m,y) where: 
d is the day 
m is the month 
Y is the year 
And let a], a2, . . . , a~ represent a series of ordered pairs, (al 1 ,al2), . . . , ( a ~ l  ,a~2), representing 
age ranges [al ,,al2], . . . , [aNl,a~2] such that ail = qi-lp + 1. 
And let D~=(d~,rn~,y~) represent a base date against which other dates will be compared 
(dl,ml,yl) ifDI=D2= ...= DN 
(15, m1,y3 if the days are different but the months and years are the same 
(1 5,6,~1) if the months are different but the years are the same 
((7, r9 if the years are different, Dl, D2, .. represent the age of someone 
who at Db will be greater than ail years of age and less than ai2 years 
of age and q,r, and s respectively represent day, month and year of 
birth of a person who is (ail + ai2)/2 years of age at time Db. 
// age ranges corresponding to [0,5], [6,10] 
// [11,15] , [16,20] ... etc ... 
int [I rgAge = new int [I {5,10,15,20,25,30,35,40,45,50); 
// creates Poset using today's date as the base date 
DateOfBirthPoset DOBP = new DateOfBirthPoset 
(new GregorianCalendar () , rgAge) ; 
// illustrates creating DateOfBirth nodes using 
// different date formats 
DateOfBirthNode A = new ~ateOfBirthNode (112/13/197811, rgAge) ; 
DateOfBirthNode B = new DateOfBirthN0de(~~19780213~~, rgAge) ; 
DateOfBirthNode C = new DateOfBirthNode (111978020111, rgAge) ; 
DateOfBirthNode D = new DateOfBirthNode ("1 978111311, rgAge) ; 
DateOfBirthNode E = new DateOfBirthN0de(~~19791013~~, rgAge) ; 
DateOfBirthNode T1 = A.lub(B,rgAge); / /  result: 19780213 
DateOfBirthNode T2 = C.lub(A,rgAge); / /  result: 19780215 
DateOfBirthNode T4 = D.lub(E,rgAge); // result: date of birth 
// corresponding to 
/ /  midpoint of age range 
/ /  [25,301 
Figure 8: How a DateOfBirthPoset is used 
The following is an example of how one might create a PowerPoset in the Hierarchy.xm1 file: 
cDateOfBirthPoset Name="AgeH BaseDate="20060101" AgeRanges="5,30,50,70,90"1~ 
I I 
Example 7: How a PowerPoset can be instantiated in the Hierarchyam1 file 
In the above example we have create an DateOfBirthPoset with a base date of Jan 
1 st, 2006. The age ranges it uses are [0,5], [6,30], [3 1,501, [5 1,701, and [7 1,901. 
SparseMatrixPoset 
A SparseMatrix is sparse in the sense that it compactly represents a matrix. The 
matrix it represents has all possible values of a MatrixPoset on one axis, and some quantity 
(such as fiequency) on the other. A SparseMatrixPoset is usell  when one needs to perform 
a join between two or more tables. Consider for example the case where a patient's 
demographic details reside in one table, and their diagnostic codes reside in another. 
The SparseMatrixPoset can represent these diagnoses as a set of pairs (MN,f) where 
MN is a MatrixNode and f is the frequency that the contents of the node appears. For 
example, if a patient has 10 cardiac dysrhythas (which are represented by the ICD9-CM 
code 427.89) then that would be represented by the pair: (427.89, 10). A 
SparseMatrixPoset then can be used to hold the frequencies of occurrence of all diagnoses 
in the diagnosis table for each patient. 
In order to create a SparseMatrixPoset one must specify the maximum number of 
(m, f )  pairs that can occur in a given row in addition to passing a reference to a an 
instance of a MatrixPoset class (which in our latter example would define all possible 
ICD-9-CM codes). 






is the name given to this SparseMatrixPoset 
is the matrix lattice used to define the LUB of the 
MatrixNodes stored in this Poset. 
is the maximum number of Name-Value pairs that 
can be stored in a given row. 
The following is an example of how one might create a SparseMatrixPoset in the 
Hierarchy.xm1 file: 
<SparseMatrixPoset ' ="SparseMatrixPoset-ICD9 Matri~LatticeName=*'ICD9~Codes" Columns="39/> 
Example 8: How a PowerPoset can be instantiated in the Hierarchy.xm1 file 
In the above example, we have created a SparseMatrixPoset. The values it can 
assume are defmed in the MatrixPoset named ICD9-Codes. This SparseMatrixPoset 
contains 39 pairs of columns. Each pair stores an ICD9 code of a diagnosis together with 
the frequency with which that diagnoses occurred for that patient. 
PassThroughPoset 
A PassThroughPoset is useful when one wishes to add fields to a row that should 
not be anonyrnized. The LUB of a PassThroughNode and another node is the unchanged 
original node. The measure of a PassThroughPoset is always 0 because its information 
can never be degraded. 
I I 
Example 9: How a PassThroughPoset can be instantiated in the Hierarchy.xm1 file 
MultiPoset and MultiNode and MultiL UBSet 
Tabular data is often represented in a table where the rows represent patient records 
and the columns represent attributes. A MultiNode is used to represent a data row and an 
array of MultiNodes is used to represent a table. A MultiPoset is used to fmd the LUB of 
one or more rows, as follows: 
Where A and B are two MultiNodes representing two different patient records. i.e. the LUB 
of a MultiPoset is simply the pair-wise LUB of the constituent elements of its inputs. 
To define a MultiPoset, one must fmt construct Posets of other types such as 
RangePosets, PowerPosets. These individual Posets are then aggregated into a MultiPoset. 
A MultiNode in turn is constructed by aggregating Node classes corresponding to the 
individual columns. Since the LUB of two MultiNodes may not have a unique value, we 
introduce the MultiLUBSet class, whose sole data member is an array of LUBSets. Each 
LUBSet in the array represents the possible generalizations of an attribute. 
// Assume the code for examples 1,2 and 3 appears above 
// create a 3 column MultiPoset 
MultiPoset MP = new MultiPoset (3) ; 
// add the nodes 
MP . setCol ("Age RangeM, RL ,I) 
MP.setC~l(~Has HN"IPLI1) 
MP. setcol (mZipw,ML, 1) 
1;  
// Assume table columns are "age rangen, "zipu, and 
// three Boolean fields representing renal failure, 
// HIV and colon cancer 
// create two MultiNodes 
// the first with values <lo-30 years, 0213*, (F,T,T)> 
// the second with values <20-35 years, 02134*, (FIFIT) > 
MultiNodel MN1 = new MultiNode (3) ; 
MultiNode2 MN2 = new MultiNode (3) ; 
MNl. set (1, (PosetNode) RL1) ; // Age range: 10-30 years 
MNl . set (2, (PosetNode) ML1) ; // Zip Code: 0213* 
MNl . set (3, (PosetNode) PL1) ; // (False, True, True) 
MN2. set (1, (PosetNode) RL2) ; // Age range 20-35 years 
MN2. set (2, (PosetNode) ML2) ; // Zip Code: 0214* 
MN2. set (3, (PosetNode) PL2) ; // (False, False, True) 
LUBSet result = MP.getLubset (MNl,MN2); 
// result now holds a LubSet containing a MultiNode 
// < [10f35] I "021**", (FITIT)> 
Example 10: How a MultiPoset and MultiNode can represent a table 
Unlike other Posets, MultiPosets are never declared in the Hierarchy.xm1 file. Rather, they 
are used internally by the toolkit to store rows. 
Columns.XML File 
Heretofore we've explained how to create various Posets in the Hierarchy.xm1 file, 
but we have not explained how to load data associated with these Posets from a file. Here 
we show how one can load data from a Comma Separated Values file (CSV) into an array 
of MultiNodes. But before one can load a CSV file one must first bind one or more Posets 
to specific columns in the file. This is done via the Columns.xm1 file. 
<Column Name="Age-Year' :"Defal lf' ?t="Age-range~oset" Weigh 3.023" I> 
<Column Name="Gender" H Default - - "MvSuppressionPoset" W e i ~  ="988.823 /> 
<Column Name="Ethnic Ori ="Defauli "M ySuppressionPoset" 18.176/> 
<Column Name="mrnM "Defaun Poset="MyPassThroughPoset" Weight="( 
<Column Name="total-chrg' erarchy="~efauk' ~set="MyPassThroughPoset' feic ="0/> 
<Column Name="high-exp" Hierarchy="Default" Poset="MyPassThroughPoset" Weight="O"P 
<Column Name="total_chrg_04" Hierarchy="Default" Poset="MyPassThroughPoset" Weight="O/> 
<Column h ie="other-dx-code" Hierarchy="Default" Poset="SparseMatrixPoset-lCD9 
-deight="2.566 /> 
CLolumn Name="principal~xXcode" Hierarchy="Default" Poset="SparseMatrixPosetcODRG" 
Weight="7.2263 /> 
<lTableDescription> 
Example 11: How to use the Columns.xml file to bind Posets to specific columns 
As shown in the example above, the columns are declared in same order as they 
appear in the CSV file. The relative weights for each row can also be specified here. These 
weights are multiplied by the measure to give the value of any particular data item. At first 
glance it may seem that the toolkit is founded on weighted indexing but this is not so. 
While we do provide the facility to implement weighted indexed measures, this facility is 
optional and left to the discretion of the user. Implementing such a facility also allows us to 
empirical compare weighted indexes against other measures. 
The Hierarchy.xm1 file allows one to define namespaces, so that multiple Posets 
could be, for example, defined with the same name. By specifying Hierarchy= "Default" in 
each column we are declaring that the Poset specified can be found within the default 
namespace. 
Ambiguators 
An ambiguator is a class that implements an algorithm for transforming a table 
stored in a DataSet class into a table that has k-anonymity. We use the terms like 
ambiguate and ambiguator rather than anonymize and anonymizer because k-anonymity 
does not always lead to anonymity (as shown on page 24). 
The DSG toolkit is based on the Vinterbo optimization fnunework for 
anonymization. All k-anonymization algorithms must implement the Ambiguator class and 
receive their data in the form of a DataSet class - a class that simply contains an array of 
MultiNodes (which represents an m y  of rows) and a generalization hierarchy of 
MultiNodes. 
1 public class DataSet I 
I public MultiPoset MP; 
public MultiNode[] data; 
I J 
Figure 9: Data members of the DataSet Class 
Each Ambiguator returns its results as an AmbigRun object whose basic data 
members are listed in Figure 10. 
public class AmbigRun 
{ 
/ /  The original data set that was ambiguated 
public DataSet origData; 
// Ambiguator used to ambiguate this data 
public Ambiguator ambig; 
// Final data --- filled in by Ambiguator 
public Mu1 tiLUBSet [ I  ambigData ; 
1 
Figure 10: AmbigRun Member Functions 
The DSG Toolkit contains three ambiguators: Greedy, Greedy-DXCG and Partition 
and the toolkit is extensible to allow for the addition of other algorithms. Each Ambiguator 
must implement the Ambiguator class. The basic data members of this class are listed in 
Figure 12. We have abstracted the arguments to each ambiguator as an AmbigArgs class. 
This abstraction enables a series of arnbiguators to be called using the same data in a loop 
(enabling side-by-side comparisons of performance). We now explain in greater detail the 
built in algorithms. 
The Greedy Algorithm 
The Greedy ambiguation algorithm was written by the author. It is essentially a hill 
climbing algorithm. Given a row, it creates a LUBSet containing the row, and successively adds 
rows that least increase the measure of the LUBSet until the LUBSet contains k rows. To arnbiguate 
an entire table, it simply repeats the steps above for each row. The pseudo-code for the Greedy 
algorithm is shown in Figure 1 1. 
ALGORITHM NAME: Greedy 
INPUTS: k Value representing desired level of k- 
anonymity 
MP A MultiPoset. 
LUB(X,y,MP) A function, that returns the least upper 
bound of the set of rows X and the row y 
according to the Poset MP. 
Measure (X) A function which returns the information 
value of the set of rows X. 
RETURNS: items[] an array of sets where items[i] contains 
the k integers representing the row 
number to be lubbed with row i. 
BEGIN 
rows f [l,N] 
cols f [l,k-1] 
for V i € rows { 
items[i] f {i} 
for V j € columns { 
rowWtoWadd f argmin r,At+i measure (LUB (items [i] , t) 





Figure 11: Greedy Algorithm Pseudo-code 
The Partition Algorithm 
The partition algorithm was written by Robert Fischer. It finds clusters of size at 
least k. It functions by recursively splitting rows of a table into two partitions. Initially the 
whole data set is regarded as one partition. The algorithm then repeatedly replaces each 
partition with two new partitions that were created by splitting the original partition. The 
process by which a partition is split is outlined as follows. First, the two elements that are 
"farthest apart" from one another are identified. The distance metric used for determining 
how far apart two nodes, A and B is as follows: 
distance = 2 * [Measure (LUB(A,B))] - [ Measure(A) + Measure(B) ] 
Where Measure(*) is some function that satisfies the properties defined on page 26. 
The two nodes found to be farthest apart respectively represent the first elements of the two 
initial partitions. The remaining elements are then assigned to the partition closest to them. 
This process is recursive. That is, the partitions created by this process are also split into 
still smaller partitions, and the process repeats until partitions of size less than k emerge, in 
which case the last split is reversed. 
The Greedy-DXCG Algorithm 
The Greedy-DXCG algorithm is similar to the greedy algorithm but it uses a 
different measure and has some specific optimizations. Like the greedy algorithm, it 
anonymizes a row by turning it into a LUBSet and by successively adding rows that least 
increase the measure of the LUBSet until the LUBSet contains k rows. 
But unlike the greedy algorithm it contains some special optimizations. These 
optimizations were necessary because an API version of the DxCG software was not 
available at the time of the experiment! Whereas the greedy algorithm would call the 
measure function n!/(n-k)! times, the Greedy-DxCG algorithm is optimized to only spawn 
the DxCG process k times -significantly reducing the overhead of creating and destroying 
the DxCG process. This reduction in calls to the DxCG software was achieved by inputting 
data to the DxCG function in batches - not by reducing the number of rows DxCG had to 
process. Nonetheless, it resulted in significant speed gains. 
Another difference between the Greedy algorithm and the Greedy-DxCG algorithm 
is their flexibility in using different measures. Whereas the Greedy algorithm can use a 
variety of measures, the Greedy-DxCG is tied to a single measure; namely, the error 
* It's the author's understanding that an API version is planned but not yet released. 
-50- 
between DxCG's predicted costs and the patient's actual costs in year 2. As a result, this 
algorithm cannot be used on tables except those that have year 1 patient data, and a column 
containing actual year 2 patient costs. Thus, the Greedy-DxCG algorithm can only be 
considered to be a specialized algorithm. Nonetheless, we created it to serve as a "gold 
standard" against we can measure other algorithms, and measures. 
Synthetic Data Generation 
Included in the DSG Toolkit are tools to generate synthetic data fiom distributions. 
Our method of generation is fairly primitive: we randomly generate the data independently 
of each other based on distributions found in the US census; however, more advanced 
techniques for synthetic data generation (such as the technique known as "multiple 
imputation") could possibly be implemented in the toolkit by future researchers. 
Command Line Interface 
The DSG toolkit has a command line interface that makes it easy to create, 
generate, evaluate, or ambiguate data. The command line tool is termed "Lubber" - a 
reference to the LUB operation. The command line options are long and extensive. We do 
not list them here, but the interested reader can find them by typing "java -jar 
privacy Tookitejar -help9'. 
Figure 12: Data Members of the AmbigRun class 
public class AmbigRun 
I 
// The original data set before ambiguation 
public DataSet origData; 
// Ambiguator used to ambiguate this data 
public Ambiguator ambig; 
// Ambiguated Data 
public Mu1 tiLUBSet [I ambigData ; 
// An array of k integers for each row that explains 
// which rows were combined to create each row. 
/ /  i . e. ambigData [i] = LUB (items [i ] [ O ]  , . . . ,items [i ] [k] ) 





We wish to simulate a situation where a variety of hospitals will contribute patient 
data to a hypothetical researcher who is seeking to construct a model that can be applied in 
a wide variety of geographies and hospitals. 
The latter definition has a number of implications. A model that is applicable across 
a wide variety of geographies and hospitals will typically only use inputs (such as age, 
gender, and diagnoses) that are hospital or geography independent. 
As a result, we believe our typical researcher would not be interested in fields that 
are geography-specific (such as a zip code) or hospital-specific (such as "name of admitting 
physician") unless such fields are first converted into a field that is neither hospital nor 
geography specific. An example of such a conversion might be converting the geography- 
specific field, "zip code" to the more general field "cost-of-living adjusted income." 
Following the above logic, we have chosen to exclude hospital-specific or 
geography-specific fields from our analysis. This is not to say that such fields are not usell  
to some researchers. But rather a reflection that such fields may not be of use to a 
researcher trying to create a risk model of risk for a disease. Moreover there is utility in our 
choice - by excluding such fields we are likely to increase the information content of 
geography and hospital independent fields like gender, age and diagnosis. 
To simulate a real application for the data, we have outputted our anonymized data 
into RiskSmart 2.0 - a predictive model produced by DxCG Inc., used by health insurers to 
predict their expenditures in future years. In particular, the RiskSmart model allows one to 
predict the cost of each patient in future years, based on a patient's demographic profile and 
diagnoses in the current year. Health insurers typically use Risksmart to identify patients 
whom they could select for preventive treatment - a procedure often termed "disease 
management." The idea behind disease management is simple: "an ounce of prevention can 
save a pound of cure." 
The RiskSmart model has a number of outputs. For the purposes of this dissertation 
we have elected to consider only its prediction of 2004 costs based on our 2003 data. For 
all of our experiments, we measured the performance of the final output on DxGG - by 
summing the absolute errors between DxCG's predictions of expenses and the true 
expenses for each individual. 
The Data Set 
We began with real data set consisting of the demographic data, procedures and 
diagnosis of inpatients from hospitals in the Boston area. Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approval was obtained for this study. 
The data consisted of the following tables: 
demo-03 and demo-04: which contain the demographic information of 28,795 and 
32,307 inpatients respectively for individuals registered at the health network in the 
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Figure 13: Fields in Tables Demo-03 and Demo-04 
&-03 and &-04: these tables contain 932,657 and 1,121,264 diagnoses of 
inpatients for the years 2003 and 2004 respectively. Entries in this table are linked 
to those in the demographics table through the mrn field - a unique identifier for 












Figure 14: Fields in tables dx-03 and dx-04 
As shown in Figure 15, there were only a handfbl of unique diagnoses. 
I I I I I 
Figure 15: There are only a handful of unique diagnoses 
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Diagnosis Table 
Approach 
To measure information loss in our experiments we propose a variety of measure 
functions. These measure functions could be regarded as constituting a spectrum of 
defensibility ranging fiom measures that value all fields equally to those that value each 
data item based on its predicted information content. 
Method 1: Equal weights (all columns have the same value of 1 .O) 
This measure function has two parts. The first computes a score for each 
field, the second sums the fist measure into a score for each row. 
This measure function assigns a score of 0 to all leaf nodes, 1 to each leafs 
parent, 2 to the leaf parent's parents, and so on and so forth. Each of these values, 
however are divided by M - the height of the highest height in the hierarchy. This 
ensures that the scores range fiom 0 to 1.0 - 0 being assigned to the leaves and 1.0 
being assigned to the topmost node in Poset or DGH. 
The measure for each row is simply the sum of the scores for each field in 
the row. This can be interpreted as assigning a weight of 1.0 for each column. In 
sum this measure function can be written as 
Where: 
R is a row consisting of i columns 
h is the height of the element in column i within the Poset or DGH 
corresponding to column i. 
M is the highest height in the DGH or Poset corresponding to column i 
or the highest possible range in a RangePoset. 
This measure function has properties highly similar to the PREC metric 
discussed in Figure 4 insofar as the position of a field in a DGH or Poset 
completely determines its score. Such measures would assign the same 
score, for example, to knowing if someone had HIV to knowing if they 
were male of female. 
Method 2: Using empirically estimated column weights 
Whereas the last measure weighted all columns equally, this measure 
hc t ion  assigns a unique weight to each column according to an empirically 
derived measure (the mutual information of that column to the variable we are 
trying to predict). This empirical measure seeks to estimate the "true" information 
the column has with the predicted variable. The greater the amount of reliable data 
one has to estimate the mutual information, the greater the confidence one can have 
that the estimate of mutual information converges with its true score. 
Where wi is defined as the mutual information between column i and the column 
we are trying to predict. The mutual information between a column X, and a 
column we are trying to predict C, is defined as: 
The mutual information is an information theoretic measure. It represents 
the decrease in entropy of the random variable C, given the random variable X i.e.: 
Method 3: Using an empirically estimated information measure of each value 
Unlike the latter measure which assigns a single number to an entire 
column, this measure assigns a value to each cell within a table. This assigned value 
is the point-wise mutual information with the target variable. 
The point-wise Mutual Information between a vector x, and a target variable 
C (the column we are trying to predict) is defined as: 
PMI(X = x,C = c) = log, (;:;;:I 1 
If the values x and c are statistically dependent, the mutual information will 
be positive. Conversely, if the two values are disassociated greater than chance, the 
Mutual Information will be negative. 
We have chosen to value both evidence of association and disassociation 
equally by using the absolute value of the point-wise mutual information as our 
measure. Further, because our system seeks to minimize scores we multiplied the 
absolute value of the score by -1 - so data values with more information will be 
treated as more valuable. 
There are some issues with this measure. First, by summing the pointwise 
mutual information scores for each column of a row into a single measure, it 
assumes that the columns are all independent - i.e. that there is no redundancy in 
the information between the columns - an assumption almost certainly violated in 
practice. Second, it violates the monotonicity property we required in a measure 
function earlier because a generalized value may actually have a higher score than 
its ancestors. This discrepancy reflects the fact that our mutual information estimate 
is exactly that: an estimate. Had our tables had enough rows, our values would 
converge to the true values and monotonicity would be preserved. We therefore 
relax our requirement for monotonicity when using this measure. 
Method 4: Using the degradation of the predictive model we intend to use as 
our measure 
This measure is perhaps the most rationally defensible. It uses the 
degradation in predictive performance in our intended application as our measure 
of information loss. Unlike the other methods, it escapes the weighted index 
problem by considering a row in totality rather than by summing individual 
measures for each column. 
For the purposes of our experiments our final intended predictive model is 
DXCG Inch RiskSmart 2.0. 
How we calculate mutual information scores: 
To the tables dx-03 and demo-03 we added a column called "high-expense." This 
column holds a Boolean value that was set to 1 if a patient had expenditures of more than 
$25,000 in year 2 (i.e. 2004), and 0 otherwise. This is the target variable for all mutual 
information calculations. We also added implied rows to form an augmented table as 
describe in Figure 7. This allowed us to calculate a mutual information score for each level 
of generalization in all Posets. 
Mutual information scores are known to be biased towards rare values. For the sole 
purpose of calculating mutual information scores we temporarily removed all values 
occurring less than 6 times. 
This resulted in the following: 
a. 405 zip codes remained out of 1537 
b. One age y e a r  (14) was removed (it occurred only once) 
c. One ethnic group race was eliminated (NATIVE HAWAIIAN which 
occurred only once) 
A Per1 script was used to calculate these mutual information scores. Its output was portions 
of the Hiemrchy.XML configuration file. 
Data Cleansing and Data Preparation Procedures 
As is typical of most data sets, we discovered a number of inconsistencies in our 
data. For example, we noticed that a number of individuals had their ageyear field set to 
zero - even though their dates of birth were in the distant past. 
In order to prepare our data for anonymization we performed a number of procedures: 
1. Removed obvious identifiers - including first name, last name, uid, social security 
number, and address. 
2. Removed redundant fields - a field is redundant relative to another if knowing the 
second field adds no information not already known from the first. For example, the 
field ''race_full" adds no information if one already knows the value of the field 
"ethnic group." The former is a number representing an ethnic group, the latter, 
merely a human readable 111  text version of the first. This resulted in the 
elimination of the field race-hll. We also deleted the field principalgx which was 
simply a human readable version of the ICD-9-CM code stored in principalgx-cd 
and other-dx-cd which was a human readable version of the DRG code stored in 
other-dx. We also elected to delete the fields admission date and discharge date 
since they had a very low mutual information score and much of their predictive 
information seemed to be captured in the field 10s (which stores the length of stay in 
the hospital). 
3. Set all ages 1 90 to 90+ - this is a common practice and is consonant with the 
procedures used to anonymized records in HIPAA. 
4. Deleted patients in demo-03 and dx-03 2003 that did not exist in demo-04 - 
To test our anonymized data, we programmed DxCG's Risksmart software to 
predict the cost of a patient in 2004 based on their profile in 2003. But unless we 
have a patient's 2004 data (including their actual 2004 expenses), we have no way 
of calculating the error between the predicted and actual costs. Thus for the 
purposes of our experiment, we deleted all patients who didn't have both 2003 and 
2004 data. 
5. Deleted hospital-specific and geographic specific information - This is in line 
with our assumption outlined above. Fields purged include zipcode and admitting 
physician. 
6. Deleted data items with low mutual information ratios - Mutual information 
scores are known to be biased towards elements with a large number of possible 
values. To counteract this bias, we divided each mutual information score by the 
mutual information score of a column with random values chosen from a set with 
the same number of possible values. This ratio may be termed the mutual 
information gain or MI Ratio for short. We used the MI ratio as a comparison of 
information content across fields (see Appendix 1 for a proof that Mutual 
Information scores can be compared across tables). To estimate the MI ratio we 
computed the value 10 times, and took the average of the 10 runs. 
We chose to delete all entries with a mutual information gain of less than 
2.0. This threshold (two times random chance) was arbitrarily chosen. Our choice 
was somewhat supported by the fact that age yea r  had a ratio just above three while 
age-month and age-day - fields that one would expect would essentially be 
random and have little medical causal effect - had MI ratios of 1.73 and 0.83 
respectively; thus placing our threshold above random chance, but below a value 
known to have medical causality. We also eliminated enc-num - a unique ID 
assigned to each patient visit. Figure 16 shows the fields that were kept and 
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!Ids that were kept and disca 
In some cases, the same field would appear in both the demographic and 
diagnoses tables. In each case, we had to determine which table was best to 
estimate the MI-ratio for that field. In the case of demographic fields such as 
gender, it would be incorrect to estimate their MI-ratio from the dx-03 table 
because the same person will have the gender repeated many times - in effect 
giving greater weight to people with more diagnoses. 
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Figure 17: MI Ratios and fields kept in Dx-03. 
An b'N/A" in the "kept" column acknowledges the fact 
that the MI could not be appropriately estimated from 
this table. 
The final result of our data preparation and data cleansing procedures was a 
table with two extraneous fields - extraneous to the extent that these fields were not 
used by the DxCG predictive model. It should be noted, however, that the single 
extraneous field, principalqx-cd (principal procedure code) will later be shown to 
translate into 15 separate fields in the final table used for the anonymization 
process. This could potentially amplifying the extent of the "damage" this single 
field could bring to the anonymization process insofar as the presence of extraneous 
fields in the anonymization process are likely to divert the ambiguation algorithm 
from preserving data from the fields that will actually be used (in the final 
predictive model). 
7. Deleted data items occurring fewer than k times - On page 25, we outline an 
attack that can be applied to data items occurring fewer than k times. To thwart this 
attack all data items occurring fewer than k times in the data set were deleted. For 
the purpose of this experiment we have set k to 3. 
8. Preserved fields needed to calculate error - we configured our anonymization 
software to "pass-through" certain fields whose sole purpose was to facilitate 
calculate error. To ensure such fields had no effect on the anonyrnization process, 
we set the weight of such fields to zero, and used a "PassThroughPoset.~' Fields in 
this category include mrn (a unique medical records identifier), tot-chrg - 04 (the 
patient's total expenses in 2004) and high-expense (a Boolean field set to 1 only if 
a patient's expense in 2004 > $25,000 and 0 otherwise). 
Finally, following these data cleansing and preparation procedures, we randomly 
selected 1000 patients and joined their information in the demo-03 and dx-03 tables as 
follows. First we noted that a patient had at most 62 distinct diagnoses. However only 17 
people had more than 39 diagnoses - allowing us to completely capture the diagnoses of 
98311000 = 98.3% of the patients in the data set using two groups of 39 columns for each 
person. These two groups represented "name-value" pairs. The first 39 columns (Called 
dxFieldName1, dxFieldName2, . . . , dxFieldName39) stored the diagnosis codes (i.e the 
names). While the remaining 39 columns (named dxFieldVal1, dxFieldVal2, ... , 
dxFieldVal39) stored the corresponding frequencies for each diagnoses (i.e. the values). 
The diagnoses were stored fiom left to right. If a patient did not have as many as 39 
diagnoses the rightmost fields would hold one or more blank values. If a patient had more 
than 39 diagnoses, the latter diagnoses were purged; however, this only happened in 1.7% 
of the cases. These two groups of 39 columns were then loaded into a SparseMatrixNode, 
to enable the LUB operation to be performed on them across rows. Figure 18 shows the 
final table used for our experiments. 
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Figure 18: The final table used for experiments 
Experimental Setup 
1. We seek to answer three questions: 
a) Which algorithm is best? Greedy or Partition? 
b) Which measure function is best? Vinterbo-1.0, Column-MI or Value-MI? 
We have defined three measure functions to guide our anonymization process 
(which essentially constitute an optimization problem). Under what 
circumstances are any of the measures better than the others? Does the choice 
of anonymization algorithm or size of the data set affect the outcome? 
c) Can we predict what fields will ultimately be used by the end user to 
predict the target variable in their models? To what extent do mistakes in 
predicting the fields used by the end-user affect the predictive performance 
of the ultimate model? 
Most predictive models take as input a certain set of pre-specified fields. The 
same is true of our anonymization process. While we may not be able to 
anticipate the variables used by researchers to build their predictive models, we 
do have control over what fields we wish to keep or purge before we even begin 
the anonymization process. Our choices of which fields to keep and which to 
discard can have an affect on the accuracy of the end user's predictive model. 
That is, if we input extraneous fields (extraneous in the sense that they are not 
ultimately used by the end-user), one would expect the anonymization 
algorithm to sacrifice some precision in these fields to preserve information in 
the extraneous fields. Can we successllly predict the fields that will be needed 
by our model? And if not, will mistakes in field selection matter? 
We seek to answer these questions by conducting a number of experiments. First, we 
compare greedy to partition on synthetic data. Second we compare greedy to partition using 
various measure functions on real patient data. Third we compare the performance of these 
algorithms on data sets of different sizes. 
a) Performance of greedy and partition on synthetic data 
A test set of 100 rows was randomly generated based on census data for Hampshire 
country, Massachusetts. The fields generated included a census block (the most 
finely granular physical location available in the census data as shown in Figure 3), 
Age (again based on census data), and 5 randomly generated Boolean fields (the 
first which could be interpreted as setting the randomly generated person as male or 
female), the remaining 4 being randomly generated and could be thought to 
simulate the presence or absence of a disease or condition. A Vinterbo style 
measure function was used (where the value of cell is represented by its hierarchy 
and all columns are weighted equally). 
Information Loss 
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Figure 19: Greedy clearly outperforms 
Partition on synthetic data 
Figure 19, shows that greedy clearly dominates the partition algorithm according to the 
Vinterbo measure of information loss. This would seem to indicate that Greedy 
outperforms partition on data sets where the fields are generated independently of one 
another. However, in the next experiment we'll show that on real data, where there does 
exist dependence between fields, Partition clearly outperforms Greedy as measured by the 
predictive performance of the outputted data in our final application (DxCG). 
In our next experiment we used the dataset of 1000 patients from the 2003 dataset 
described earlier. This dataset was anonymized using the greedy and partition algorithms 
that were run using 3 different measure functions. 
1. Vinterbo-1 .O - where every field is assigned a value according to its position in 
the hierarchy for its respective column. The score for a row is simply the sum of 
scores for each column. We add the designation "1.0" to the name of the 
measure function because it sums scores for each columns with a weight of 1 .O; 
and it is only one example of the allowable functions in the Vinterbo 
framework; however for brevity, all references hereafter to this measure will 
simply be referred to as "Vinterbo." 
2. Col-MI - similar to the Vinterbo measure, however each column is assigned a 
weight corresponding to the mutual information between that column and the 
target variable - in this case high-expense (a Boolean variable which is 1 if a 
patient's expenses exceeded $25,000 in 2004, 0 otherwise). To calculate the 
value of a row, one calculates the values for each column as per Vinterbo, but 
each column value is multiplied by its corresponding weight before the sum is 
taken. 
3. Value-MI - where every distinct value in a column is assigned a score 
according to its point-wise mutual information with the high-expense field. 
The output of the anonyrnization process was then fed through a Per1 script, which did a 
number of operations to prepare the data for input into DxCG's Risk Smart model: 
a) Deleting fields not used by the DxCG model (including ethnic group, and 
principaljx-cd) 
b) Converting all age ranges (such as [10,20]) into the mean of the range. 
c) Duplicating every row with a suppressed gender into two fictitious persons: with all 
attributes identical to the original person - except that the first person was assigned 
the gender male, the second assigned female. This step is necessary because DxCG 
cannot handle individuals with a suppressed gender. Our way of overcoming this 
was to input both genders into DxCG and to take the average of the predicted 
expenses of the two fictitious persons. 
d) After the data was prepared it was passed through the DxCG model which was 
programmed to output a prediction of a patient's 2004 expenses based on their 
profile from the previous year (2003). The "error" for each individual was 
computed as the difference between a person's actual expenses in 2004 and 
DxCG's predicted expense. The sum, mean, and standard deviation of all such 
errors were taken. 
As shown in Figure 20 and Figure 21, the partition algorithm outperformed greedy 
both in the presence and absence of extraneous fields. 
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Figure 20: Best run of each algorithm when all 
fields used 
As shown in Figure 21, Partition using the Vinterbo measure outperformed greedy 
when extraneous fields were inputted into the anonymization process. 
Best Run of Each Algorithm vs. 
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Figure 21: Best run of each algorithm when no 
extraneous fields were used 
However we notice an interesting result in Figure 22 - that there is no best measure 
Mi& Algorithm is Best? 









Figure 22: Comparison of Greedy with Partition when 
all fields including extraneous ones were used. 
per se. Rather, the measure function that is "best" is highly dependent on which algorithm 
was used. In fact, a complete rank reversal was observed; the best measure function for the 
greedy algorithm (Vinterbo) was the worst measure function for Partition - and vice versa. 
Wch Algorittm is Best? 
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Figure 23: Comparison of Greedy to Partition 
when no extraneous fields were used 
The presence of extraneous fields had a marked effect on our results. When 
extraneous fields had been removed, the best measure function for partition was the Col-MI 
measure whereas in the presence of extraneous fields, best performance came from the 
Vinterbo measure. 
Upon reflection this result was not surprising because the extraneous fields (i.e. 
principalqx-cd and ethnicsoup) had higher mutual information scores than a critical 
field used by DxCG called "other-dx-cd," which stores the ICD9-CM codes associated 
with the patient. 
This meant that the Col-MI measure function de-emphasized a critical field for 
DxCG while simultaneously applying a higher weight to extraneous fields. It is therefore 
not surprising, that the Vinterbo measure (which gives equal weight to all fields), 
outperformed COL-MI in the previous experiment because the Col-MI measure served to 
amplify the negative impact of the extraneous fields whereas the Vinterbo measure did not. 
Conversely, when all extraneous fields were removed, one would expect Col-MI (which 
recognizes the relative weights of columns) to outperform the Vinterbo measure. This was 
also the case. 
So far, the partition algorithm has always outperformed the greedy algorithm. 
Might the size of the data set affect the outcome? To investigate, we repeated our initial 
experiment (which was conducted on a data set of 1000 rows) on data sets of 500,100, and 
50 rows. These smaller data sets were created by truncating the original at the desired 
number of rows from the one end of the file. 
Minimum Error for Greedy & Partition 
Across Varying Data Set Sizes 












Algorithm 1 Data Set Size 
Figure 24: Average Error Across Different Data 
Set Sizes (Input: All fields) 
As shown in Figure 24, the average error is inversely related to the data set size 
regardless of whether partition or greedy is used. This is not surprising because the smaller 
the data set, the less likely the algorithm will find k records that are substantially similar. 
Thus, in small data sets, the algorithms are forced to combine individuals with little in 
common - resulting in the wholesale data loss. But as the data set size grows, the likelihood 
of finding similar individuals increases - enabling such individuals to be combined with 
less information loss. 
Varying the size of our data sets also allows us to analyze the data in another 
important way: it allows us to see if the best measure for each algorithm was consistent 
across data sets of varying sizes. This in turn enables us to provide some recommendations 
for the best measure for each algorithm in a more rigorous fashion than our previous 
analysis - which only measured performance on a data set of a fmed size (1000 
individuals). 
To determine the best measure for each algorithm, we analyzed the performance of the 
measures by calculating the overall error across all data set sizes and by ranking the 
performance of the measures in each run, and converting the ranks into "votes" using two 
voting mechanisms (Johnson 2005): 
A) Condorcet Voting (Schulze 2003) - which turns the ranks for each data set size into 
a vote. 
B) Majority Voting (Green-Armytage 2006) - which counts as a vote only the best 
measure for each data set size. 
Before proceeding, we will explain the two voting schemes here. 
Majority Rule Voting 
This is a very common voting scheme and is the voting scheme used in most 
political elections. The winner of the vote is the candidate that receives the most votes. In 
the context of our experiment, each data set size will cast a vote corresponding to the best 
measure for its data set. Two "elections" were held - one to determine the best measure for 
the greedy algorithm, the other to determine the best measure for the partition algorithm. 
There are, however, some well-known problems with the majority voting scheme. 
For instance, it is considered the "least-democratic" among commonly used voting schemes 
- in the sense that it is least likely to reflect the will of voters insofar as it can declare a 
candidate a winner even though that candidate would have lost against another candidate in 
a two-way race. This is a reflection of a limitation in this voting system that allows a voter 
to only specify their "first-preference," thus disallowing a voter from transferring their vote 
to a second-preference, should their first preference not win. 
Condorcet Voting 
This system was invented by the 18th century French mathematician and 
philosopher Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, who held the title of "the Marquis de 
Condorcet." Unlike the prior voting scheme, this voting scheme allows voters to rank 
candidates. It has been often presented as an alternative voting scheme in political elections 
- and is considered to have fewer irregularities than majority-voting. 
The system works as follows. Voters rank candidates in order of preference. For every 
possible combination of two candidates, a simulated two-way race is held. In each two-way 
race, all the votes in each ballot are discarded except the highest-ranked candidate among 
the two being considered. In this fashion, every ballot can vote for a preferred candidate in 
every simulated two-way race. The candidate that wins the most two-way races is 
considered the winner. 
For the purposes of our experiment, the Condorcet voting function offers a convenient 
way to convert the ranking of measures for each data set into a vote that captures such 
rankings. In particular, every data set size represents a ballot. Each ballot will consist of the 
ranking of the measures for that data set size. The winner will be the measure that wins the 
most simulated two-way races. 
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Figure 25: Performance of Measures Across Data 
Sets of Varying Sizes When No Extraneous Fields 
Were Used. The Vinterbo measure was the best 
measure for the Greedy algorithm, regardless of what 
metric was used. Similarly Col-MI was the best 
measure for the Partition algorithm. 
As noted before, for small data sets of randomly selected real patients, k- 
anonymization is likely to result in wholesale information loss. It is in this vein that we 
consider the data set size of 50 a special case. For such a small data set, the LUB operator 
will be likely be highly destructive - even for small k values such as 3. Because we surmise 
that such small data sets are not representative of the need of real world applications, we 
have opted to analyze the question of "which measure is best?' both with and without the 
inclusion of the data set of 50 rows. 
As shown in Figure 25, when no extraneous fields were used, this separate analysis 
made no difference in our conclusions - that is, regardless of which metric was used, the 
Vinterbo measure was found to be the best measure for the Greedy algorithm, and the Col- 
MI measure was found to be the best measure for the Partition algorithm - regardless of 
whether the total error across all runs, the Condorcet voting scheme or the majority win 
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Although the inclusion of the data set with 50 rows made no difference in our 
results, the same was not true when extraneous fields were added. In particular including 
the 50-row data set confused our results - creating a 3 way tie for Partition. Interestingly, 
when no extraneous fields were used the Vinterbo metric was best; however, when 
extraneous fields were added, the Point-wise Mutual Information (PMI) metric was found 
to be better. We surmise the reason for this is that the Point-wise Mutual Information 
metric mitigates to some extent the effect of extraneous columns. 
Figure 26: Total error for all algorithms across data sets 
of varying sizes. 
Experimental Conclusions: 
Although one would need to repeat this experiment on many data sets to make 
strong conclusions, our data suggests the following: 
For data sets where all fields are generated independently of each other (something 
that rarely occurs in practice): 
o Greedy outperforms Partition 
For real patient data 
o Partition outperforms Greedy 
When the fields that will ultimately be used are known (and are the only fields 
passed into the anonymization process): 
o The best measure for the Partition algorithm is Col-MI. 
o The best measure for the Greedy algorithm is Vinterbo. 
When the fields that will ultimately be used are unknown: 
o The best measure for the Greedy algorithm is PMI 
o The best measure for the Partition algorithm is Vinterbo. The Col-MI 
measure came in a close second. 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation we have presented a new threat model for privacy and a toolkit 
that allows us to measure the effectiveness of various approaches to achieving anonymity. 
We have introduced two new general-purpose algorithms for anonymizing data. 
From a theoretical perspective, we have also shown that previously published 
measures of information loss are difticult to defend rationally; while also introducing a 
variety of measures that in principle are more attractive than previously published 
measures. 
Our new measures represented a spectrum of defensibility - ranging from the least 
defensible to the most defensible. To see if greater rational defensibility actually made a 
difference in practice, we empirically tested the performance of our measures on a real 
application (predicting future healthcare costs) and using real patient data. 
We found that the most defensible measure had significantly better performance 
than less defensible measures; while, our less defensible measures only marginally 
outperformed their indefensible counterparts. 
We have also introduced new theories including the concept of a virtual attack 
database for precisely modeling privacy threats. And by introducing the concept of 
augmented tables we were able to show that generalization and suppression; heretofore 
regarded as distinct operations are in fact the same thing when a table is augmented to 
include the fields that are implied by the original table. 
Future Directions I Questions 
There are several promising avenues for our research. The first possible avenue of 
future research involves harnessing the Bayesian model construction techniques outlined 
on page 31 to preserve more information in the de-identification process. The theory for 
this line of research follows. 
First we draw attention to the fact that one can infer a probability model from the 
concept of k-anonymity. The probability model is as follows. If an anonymized row has k- 
anonymity of k; then the probability of correctly selecting the person among the list of k- 
possible candidates is l/k. We call this latter probability the "probability of re- 
identification." The reciprocal relationship between the probability of re-identification and 
k-anonymity is important because one could potential train a Bayesian network to predict 
the probability of re-identification given any given data row. This is in turn could allow one 
to train the Bayesian model on a large data set to predict k-anonymity in smaller data sets. 
The impact of doing so could be significant because if such a Bayesian network 
could be constructed and if its error bounds could be understood, one could construct a 
system that could potentially preserve more information in the anonymization process. In 
particular, when anonymizing data in a smaller data set, we may no longer need to achieve 
k-anonymity within the data set if the Bayesian network can predict with strong confidence 
that the data will have k-anonymity within the larger population. In sum, this line of 
research may provide the capability to predict k-anonymity of a datum within the larger 
population. 
The second avenue of research would involve testing the data on different kinds of 
data sets. We have only tested the data on medical data sets. What holds true for medical 
data, may not hold true for other kinds of data. 
A third line of research involves expanding the measure functions included in the 
toolkit to include other search algorithms such as tabu search, genetic programming, and a 
greedy search that maintains n of the top entries (instead of just one). 
Appendix 1: Proof that Mutual Information Scores Can be Compared Across Tables 
Are mutual information scores in tables of different lengths comparable? 
To answer this question we present the following proof that shows that under certain 
conditions the mutual information scores between two variables are independent of table 
length. These conditions are namely that (1) the two variables are generated by the same 
process in both tables (2) the length of the shorter table is "sufficiently long" to capture the 
true probability distribution between the two variables and (3) all combinations of the two 
variables that appear in one table, also appear in the other. 
The proof follows. 
Let TI and T2 be two arbitrary tables with JS1l and IS21 rows respectively (we used the 
variable S to denote "sample space.") 
Let XI and X2 represent variables in TI and T2 respectively. 
Let C1 and C2 represent variables in TI and T2 respectively. 
Let MI(Xf; Cf) and MI(X2; C$ respectively represent the mutual information between the 
random variables XI and Cl in table 1 and X2 and C2 in table 2. 
Let pl(x) , p2(x) respectively represent the probability of the random variables XI and X2 
taking on the values X I  and x2. 
Let pl(c) , pz(c) respectively represent the probability of the random variables Cl and C2 
taking on the values cl and c2. 
Let pl(x,c), and p2(x,c) represent the probability of finding a row with the X-column 
holding value x and C-column holding variable c in tables 1 and 2 respectively. 
Let N , , ,  and N X 2 ,  represent the frequencies of co-occurrence of the column X holding 
value x and the Column C holding value c in tables 1 and 2 respectively. 
Let N ,  and Nx2 represent the frequencies of occurrence of the random variable XI and X2 
holding values XI  and x2. 
Let ISI(, and IS2( respectively represent the number of rows in TI and T2 
Let N,, and Nc2 represent the frequencies of occurrence of the random variable CI and C2 
holding values cl and c2. 
Under the following assumptions: 
Al.  The pair (xi,cl) is generated by the same random vector (X,C) in both TI and T2 
A2. Every pairs (xb ci) is independently generated from the other pairs. 
A3. All combinations of (x,c) occurring in TI also occur in T2 and vice-versa (note: this 
will probabilistically hold based on A1 and A2 if TI and T2 contain a "large" amount 
of rows). 
We wish to show that: 
1.e. that the same mutual information score will be arrived at in both tables regardless of the 
length of each table. 
Proof: 
Nx ,c, IS1 I Cx, ,, & - l o g ,  Nx, NCI 
-- 
MI1 ( X I ;  el) - Is1 I Is1 I 
MI2 (X2 ;c2 1 Nx2 $3 
Let t =IS21/1SlI represent the ratio of lines in TI and T2. Thus we have: 
By assumption Al, we know that the values for columns X and C were generated 
by the same process and by A2, we know the pairs are independently generated. 
Based on the latter two assumptions, the occurrence of the pairs is a function of 
length. Thus for a sufficiently long3 TI and T2 we can expect that any frequency of 
occurrence in TI, can be converted to its counterpart in T2 by multiplying by a 
constant; i.e. that: 
Substituting (2),(3) and (4) into (1) and noting that by A3, the summation in the 
numerator covers the same pairs of values as that in the denominator we have: 
Noting that ISII = IS21/t, the above simplifies to: 
Suppose we have two tables A and B that contain rows &ith columns X and C and whose rows were generated by the 
same random vector modeled after some probability disqibution. If we estimate the probability of occurrence of the pair 
(X,C) fiom A, and it so happens that the predicted fiequ4ncy of occurrence of the pair is within the range [0,2] then we 
would expect the error to be high - because the error" - i.e. the fractional quantities in the predicted 
underlying process. 
I 
Thus under certain conditions (which are laid out in our assumptions), we have proven that 
mutual information values fiom TI and T2 are comparable. 
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